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CHINA’S “ANTIACCESS” BALLISTIC MISSILES AND
U.S. ACTIVE DEFENSE
Marshall Hoyler

R

elations between Taiwan and China have improved recently. At the same
time, U.S.-Japanese relations have worsened, partly as the result of disagreements over Futenma Marine Air Station on Okinawa. As a result, the
prospects of fighting between the United States and China over Taiwan and of
U.S. reliance on Okinawa bases to supplement carrier airpower in the course of
such a fight appear far-fetched, disastrous for the states concerned.
Of course, military professionals and the defense analytic community need to
1
think through unlikely and unwelcome scenarios. To that end, various analysts
have contributed to a lively discussion of Chinese “antiaccess” systems designed
2
to keep the United States at bay in the event of conflict. These systems include
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets like over-the-horizon (OTH) radar and increasing numbers of satellites, a more modern air force, more submarines with
better weapons, and both cruise and ballistic missiles to hold at risk our ships at
3
sea and our air bases ashore. This article examines ballistic missile threats to
carriers and air bases and the adequacy of U.S. active
Marshall Hoyler, now retired, was a professor at the
defenses.
Naval War College from 2001 through 2008. Before beChina seeks the capacity to find U.S. aircraft carricoming a teacher, he worked as a defense analyst at the
Congressional Budget Office, the Center for Naval
ers roughly a thousand miles from the mainland and
Analyses, and the Institute for Defense Analyses. Prior
to attack them with homing ASBMs (antiship ballistic
to that, he was a rifle platoon leader in the 3rd Battal4
ion, 9th Marines.
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China might overcome these challenges, perhaps as soon as five years from now.
To attack fixed targets like American air bases in Japan, China has already devel5
oped a family of road-mobile, solid-fuel, short-range ballistic missiles. One of
these missiles, the CSS-6, has the range to attack Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, a
U.S. Air Force facility that is in many ways the best air base ashore for U.S. opera6
tions against China.
The current U.S. response to these developments relies heavily on active defense
—that is, deployment of antiballistic missiles (ABMs). To defend ships at sea, the
United States is investing in Aegis/Standard Missile ABMs, and to defend air bases
ashore, in Patriot PAC-3 ABMs. The Navy originally developed Aegis ballisticmissile defense (BMD) to protect assets ashore, such as seaports of debarkation.
Given China’s ASBM efforts, however, many officers see the counterASBM mission
as an important role for Aegis BMD. Indeed, the commander of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet, Admiral Patrick Walsh, recently characterized missile defense as “essential to
7
our ability to operate freely.”
MY ARGUMENT IN A NUTSHELL
The U.S. ABM investments just described deserve critical scrutiny: asymmetries
in the competition of Chinese ballistic missiles versus U.S. antiballistic missiles
make it unlikely that active defense alone will succeed. To see why, we need to review China’s ASBM system threat to ships at sea and China’s short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) threat to U.S. air bases.
Active Defense against the ASBM System. What is the asymmetry in the ASBM
versus ABM competition? On one hand, China can easily determine how many
ABMs the United States is building and compute the limited number that each
ABM-configured Aegis ship will likely have aboard. Should it succeed in developing ASBMs that work and systems that can detect, locate, and track U.S. aircraft carriers, China can overcome active defenses by launching more ASBMs
than the United States can possibly intercept.8 It can do so with relative ease even
if Aegis/ABM systems have high single-shot kill probabilities, because Beijing’s
entire ASBM inventory is available.
The United States, on the other hand, can devote only a subset of its ABMs to
protecting carriers from the ASBM threat. Even if the Navy makes heroic efforts
to increase the fraction that is forward deployed in the western Pacific, China
will retain its “home field” numeric advantage. The United States cannot “buy
its way out” of this problem by acquiring larger numbers of Standard Missile 3s
(SM-3s). First, China can add additional ASBMs to its inventories at substantially lower costs than those the United States would incur by adding offsetting
9
numbers of ABMs. Second, if China proves able to meet the difficult technical
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obstacles required to mount ASBM attacks, it should be readily able to surmount the easier technical challenges involved in fielding dirt cheap decoys that
can lead astray already-scarce ABMs.
Suppose that Chinese C4ISR is able to detect, locate, and identify carriers
within ASBM range and a Chinese salvo proves able to overwhelm Aegis BMD
defenses. Does it follow that the penetrating ASBMs will succeed in hitting U.S.
carriers? Not necessarily. Much depends on the area of uncertainty (AOU) that
China faces, given its C4ISR capabilities, and on the “seeker footprint” of the
guidance radars on each ASBM warhead reentry vehicle. If the AOU is large and
seeker footprints are small relative to that AOU, China’s inventory may be too
small to fire the number of ASBMs needed to get a hit. For this reason, the Navy
needs to do all that it cost-effectively can to increase the size of the AOU and
thereby force China to commit large numbers of ASBMs to cover it.
Active Defense of Air Bases against Ballistic Missiles. Depending on how a Taiwan contingency unfolds, U.S. land-based aircraft might perform important
roles. However, their potential contribution diminishes the farther those bases
are from the Taiwan Strait. If available for use, Kadena Air Base on Okinawa
would easily prove the most valuable.
China has 350 to 400 CSS-6 ballistic missiles capable of reaching Kadena. A
fraction of those missiles might put it out of action, in either of two ways: they
might deliver unitary warheads that crater runways, or they might deliver cluster
munitions that destroy unsheltered aircraft on the ground. This prospect is especially worrisome for “big wing” aircraft like AWACS (the Airborne Warning
and Control System), tankers, and the P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, since
10
they are too large to place in shelters. China’s best choice would appear to be a
combination attack—cratered runways to fix aircraft in place for destruction by
follow-on cluster munitions.
The U.S. Army has based a Patriot battalion armed with the PAC-3 ABMs at
Kadena. Whether the PAC-3 can prevent Chinese missiles from putting Kadena
out of action depends on factors impossible to predict with certainty. These factors include China’s decision at the time about what fraction of its missile inventory to devote to Kadena attacks and also U.S. choices about what fraction of the
global PAC-3 inventory to send to Kadena. That said, China enjoys, again, a
“home field” advantage in that its entire CSS-6 inventory is available, whereas
11
the United States needs PAC-3s in distant theaters, like the Persian Gulf.
What’s Next? I provide below the evidence behind each of the assertions in the
argument just summarized. First, I focus on the ASBM problem. I recap the
hurdles—mainly technical but also organizational—that China would have to
overcome to field an ASBM system. Next, I review Department of Defense
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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(DoD) projections of Chinese ASBM and American antiballistic-missile inventories. I discuss what ASBM-versus-ABM exchanges might look like, given those
inventories.
12
Next, I discuss the CSS-6 threat to Kadena. Given the potential contributions of land-based aircraft, I compare Kadena to other western Pacific U.S. air
bases. I discuss the numbers of CSS-6s needed to put Kadena out of action and
compare CSS-6 inventories to those of PAC-3 ABMs.
Against this background, I discuss U.S. choices. I argue against planning to
“thin the (ASBM) herd” by attacks on Chinese soil. Instead, I argue that the
United States should devote more effort to developing and rigorously testing
passive defenses and to fielding those that look likely to perform well in defeating China’s ASBM system and its ballistic missiles that threaten air bases ashore.
If passive defense of ships or land bases appears inadequate to offset the limitations of active defense despite such efforts, I argue, the United States should consider a wider range of alternatives to defend its interests in the western Pacific.
BALLISTIC MISSILES VS. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS: CHINA’S ASBM
PROGRAM AND U.S. ACTIVE DEFENSE
China has to overcome a series of tough technical challenges to enable ASBM
strikes on carriers at sea. Recent analyses have outlined these challenges in
13
detail.
The first tasks for an ASBM system are to detect a carrier, identify it, and locate it with enough precision to launch missiles. In principle, China might perform these tasks from such platforms as fishing boats or merchant ships,
submarines, surface ships, or manned and unmanned maritime reconnaissance
aircraft. China might also rely on its developing OTH radar. However, though
some combination of these systems might work in the future, few observers
judge them adequate today. (Of course, one or more of these systems might suffice even now. For example, a carrier might pass close to a Chinese submarine, as
USS Kitty Hawk did in October 2006.)
Analysts Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin have reviewed the potential contribution of various kinds of satellites and identified strengths and limitations of
each. They say that satellite-borne ELINT (electronic intelligence) and SIGINT
14
(signals intelligence) systems could provide “long-distance early warning.”
However, their apparently exhaustive list makes no mention of ELINT satellites.
I conclude that China now has few such satellites, if any. As long as that is true,
China will be able perform ELINT/SIGINT missions for only part of each day (a
large number would be required to keep potential carrier operating areas under
continuous surveillance). That limitation matters because the United States can
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tell when SIGINT satellites come within range of carriers. During those periods,
15
the United States can use emission control (EMCON) to defeat SIGINT. The
shorter those periods, the better for the United States, because EMCON can
sharply reduce a carrier’s operational effectiveness.
Of course, China needs other capabilities to enable its satellite constellation to
provide targeting-quality data to ASBM launchers. Hagt and Durnin observe that
“China . . . lacks C4ISR infrastructure—such as information processing, band16
width capacity, and network support—needed for wide-area surveillance.” In
addition, they note “organizational and bureaucratic barriers impeding the ability of disparate space assets to perform highly time-sensitive missions,” such as
precise location of a moving carrier far at sea.17 Similarly, Thomas Ehrhard and
Robert Work state that “even when PRC [People’s Republic of China] engineers
fit all of the technical pieces together, it will take even more time for the PLAN,
PLANAF, and PLAAF [respectively, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Naval
Air Force, and Air Force] to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to convert their disparate systems and combat methods into a truly effec18
tive joint operational network.”
Despite these obstacles, Hagt and Durnin apparently regard a space-based
system as China’s best hope for detecting, locating, and tracking carriers in the
foreseeable future. Indeed, they assert that if everything goes as well for China as
they think possible to imagine, “a system competent to provide near-real-time
19
regional coverage could be five years away.”
A second set of technological challenges confronts China even if it can get
targeting-quality data to the mobile transporter-erector launchers (TELs) of
its ASBM and launch weapons promptly. Those challenges involve building an
ASBM whose reentry vehicle (RV) seeker can identify and track the carrier and
guide the RV to hit it. For example, “reentry into the atmosphere . . . would pro20
duce a plasma shield, making homing by radar and infrared difficult.” Other
technical obstacles include development of “materials needed to protect sophisticated guidance systems during reentry; the ability to function in an environment of higher speed and more severe temperature dynamics than in earlier
applications; and the ability to distinguish a target at unusual angles of attack at
21
the distances required for reentry.”
How Many Missiles?
Chinese analysts identify a third major set of technological hurdles—those in22
volved in penetrating U.S. active defenses. Those analysts are unduly pessimistic concerning this problem. To see why, we need to consider the numbers in
each side’s inventories.
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How Many ASBMs Will China Field? China’s ASBM will use the DF-21D air23
frame, which will enter production this year. Over the past four years China has
24
produced DF-21s of earlier models at the rate of nine to fifteen per year. In light
of increased funding for SM-3s that DoD announced earlier this year, it is plausible that China will produce DF-21Ds at the higher of these rates. If so, and if it
earmarks ten DF-21Ds for testing, China will have eighty ASBMs by the end of
25
2015.
How Many ABMs Will the United States Have? The Navy has configured eighteen Aegis ships (fifteen Arleigh Burke–class destroyers and three Ticonderogaclass cruisers) for anti–ballistic missile missions worldwide and will add six
26
more. It will equip such ships with two ABM models of its Standard Missile:
27
the SM-2 Block IV and the SM-3. The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic
missiles beyond the atmosphere. The SM-2 Block IV is an interim missile, based
on the SM-2 airframe, originally intended for “air-breathing” targets. It will intercept reentry vehicles in their terminal phase.
28
The Navy had forty SM-2 Block IVs at the end of 2008. It originally announced an inventory target of a hundred of these missiles. More recently, se29
nior officials have mentioned targets of seventy or eighty missiles. The Navy
had thirty-eight SM-3s at the end of 2008. As a result of an ABM-investment increase announced by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in April 2009, the Navy
30
intends to have an inventory of 220 SM-3s by the end of 2015.
How Many ABMs Will Be Available to Counter the ASBM Threat? The Navy
faces demands for ballistic-missile defense in several places. The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that the Navy will need seventy-two SM-3s to defend
31
Europe against Iranian missiles. U.S. Central Command has said that it needs
Aegis BMD capability to defend friends in the Middle East. Given North Korea’s
ballistic-missile program and hostile rhetoric, the Navy will likely need to devote
some Aegis BMD capability to countering that threat. Since Iran and North Korea field relatively unsophisticated ballistic missiles, let us assume that the Navy
decides to devote its SM-2 Block IV missiles to these missions; further, to establish a bounding case favorable to active defense against ASBMs, let us assume
that the Navy allocates none of the inherently scarce SM-3s to Middle East or
UNorth Korea missions. (Japan’s posture makes it especially plausible that the
United States would earmark only SM-2 Block IV ABMs against North Korea
—Japan has acquired Aegis/BMD ships and plans to buy SM-3 Block II
missiles.)
Given the demands just described, what allocation of Aegis BMD ships appears plausible? The Congressional Budget Office assumes that DoD would
need nine ships, including three deployed forward, for the defense of Europe
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/10
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32

against Iran. For purposes of this analysis, I assume the Navy would need to
maintain at least one Aegis BMD ship forward deployed in or near the Persian
Gulf for Middle Eastern defense and at least three additional Aegis BMD ships to
support this rotation (i.e., to keep one ship on station continuously). Similarly,
I assume one Aegis BMD ship forward deployed in the Sea of Japan, but (owing
to relative proximity to U.S. ports) only two additional ships to support the
rotation.
Table 1 summarizes the 2015 regional allocation of Aegis ships and ABMs,
given the assumptions just described. It shows that the Navy would devote thirteen Aegis BMD ships to countering Iran and three to North Korea. This would
leave eight for a Chinese contingency. Similarly, the Navy would devote seventytwo SM-3s to European defense and all seventy or eighty SMK-2 Block IVs to the
Middle East or North Korea roles. Of the 220 SM-3s produced by 2015, therefore,
the Navy could earmark 148 for China. If the Navy allocated those missiles to six of
the eight China-rotation ships, each would have twenty-four or twenty-five
aboard. (Of course, the total number available for China contingencies might be
lower if larger numbers were devoted to the counter-Iran European-defense
mission.)
What Might ASBM-vs.-ABM Exchanges Look Like?
To answer this question, we need to consider the targeting problem that each
side faces and to make explicit some simplifying assumptions. First, I assume
that the U.S. Navy would enjoy perfect warning and perfect positioning. In other
words, I assume that Aegis ships would know of ASBM launches virtually instantaneously and that they would then direct radar energy exactly where it
should be directed. In possible future combat, of course, they might not enjoy
these advantages.
TABLE 1
ASSUMED 2015 ALLOCATION OF ABMS AND AEGIS BMD SHIPS
Combatant
Command

Threat

ABMs
SM-3

EUCOM

Iran

72

CENTCOM

Iran

0

Aegis BMD Ships
SM-2 Block IV
0

Total Number in
Rotation

Subset Deployed
Forward

9

3

4

1

3

1

70–80
PACOM

DPRK

PACOM

PRC

Inventory Totals

0
148

0

8

2–3

220

70–80

24

7–8

Note: EUCOM = U.S. European Command; CENTCOM = U.S. Central Command; PACOM = U.S. Pacific Command; DPRK = North Korea.
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Second, I assume that absent enemy countermeasures, each side’s missiles
would perform well. I assume that the ASBM would have a high probability of
hit against a correctly identified and located carrier and that in turn the SM-3
would have a high probability of hit against a correctly identified and located
ASBM reentry vehicle. Compared to actual historical experience involving large
33
numbers of guided missiles, these estimates appear optimistic.
The U.S. Navy’s Targeting Problem. The Navy would almost certainly fire two
34
ABMs against each of the incoming ASBMs. Doing so would of course increase
the probability of a successful intercept. However, with only twenty-four or
twenty-five ABMs aboard, each Aegis ship escorting a carrier would at that rate
be able to engage at most thirteen ASBMs. Even if each ABM individually performed as well as the Navy could reasonably expect, the fourteenth would get
past active defenses.
So what should we expect if an ASBM-vs.-ABM clash were to occur in 2015,
which some judge the earliest that Chinese satellites would provide data suffi35
cient for an attack? As noted earlier, China might plausibly have eighty ASBMs
available by that time. If so, the United States would have to have 160 ABMs on
hand—more than the 148 ABMs in its entire “China inventory”—to fire two
against each incoming antiship missile.
Suppose that China produced fewer than ninety DF-21Ds by 2015 or used so
many in testing that it had too few to overwhelm U.S. defenses as just described.
In that case, it could seek to increase the odds in its favor in other ways. First, it
might fire earlier-model DF-21 missiles alongside its DF-21D ASBMs. (It could
36
have almost thirty such earlier-model missiles available for use in this way.)
Second, China might deploy other kinds of decoys. For example, Chinese engineers could design ASBMs to deploy aluminum-coated Mylar balloons during
the exo-atmospheric phase. The actual warhead would be inside one of the balloons; the other balloons would have lithium batteries to simulate the heat escaping from the balloon with the warhead, making it virtually impossible to
37
distinguish the warhead from the decoys. Third, it might develop penetration
aids aside from decoys. For example, Chinese engineers could defeat a hit-to-kill
intercept by enclosing the ASBM warhead in a cooled shroud, making it difficult
for the infrared sensors of the ABM “kill vehicle” to detect. Finally, it might
choose some combination of the above approaches or adopt them all. Again: the
fact that many kinds of penetration aids are quite cheap relative to ABMs is one
reason why the United States cannot “buy its way out” of this problem.
Unfortunately, the public record provides little reason to be confident that
the SM-3s now being produced can defeat the kinds of countermeasures just
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described. Indeed, that record strongly suggests that tests of Aegis/SM-3’s ability
to distinguish decoys and defeat other countermeasures have not yet been conducted. (Two pieces of evidence deserve note. First, of over sixteen tests and
nineteen cumulative SM-3 firings, the Missile Defense Agency [MDA] or the
Navy publicized every test’s objectives save one. Tests against decoys or countermeasures were never mentioned. Second, BMD critics frequently cite countermeasures and decoys in explaining their skepticism. This means SM-3
developers have strong incentives to announce such tests. That they have not
strongly suggests that the United States has not yet conducted any, let alone
tested SM-3s with the frequency needed to build confidence, given the variety of
possible countermeasures.)
China’s Targeting Problem. Imagine that China overcomes each of the technological and organizational hurdles identified earlier and that its ASBM system
passes a series of tough operational tests. Next, assume that China’s sensors detect, identify, and locate a carrier and that it decides to shoot. In such a situation,
China would need to consider two aspects of system performance in deciding
how many ASBMs to launch. Since the carrier will have moved by the time
ASBMs are fired, China would have to estimate the size of the area of uncertainty
it faces. Next, China would have to decide how many midcourse seekers would
be needed at least to cover that AOU. Finally, China would need to estimate the
probability that those seekers would correctly identify the carrier despite the
possible presence of other high-radar-cross-section ships.
The first sidebar’s analysis implies that China’s AOU would be a circle with a
radius of at least thirty-one kilometers. The second sidebar shows that much depends on the RV seeker’s “footprint”—the area on the surface that the seeker can
search to find its target. If China were in fact able to field a seeker with a
one-hundred-kilometer-radius footprint, only one RV penetrating U.S. active
defenses would be adequate to cover the entire AOU. On the other hand, a
twenty-kilometer-radius footprint would mean that China would need at least
six penetrating RVs to do so. If the AOU proved substantially larger, which
might happen if Chinese leaders deliberated at length before deciding to shoot,
far more RVs (and accordingly ASBMs) would be needed.
An Assessment
The facts reported above suggest that the United States cannot counter the
ASBM threat by buying more SM-3s. Were it to try to do so, China could offset
these efforts by investing in decoys and other countermeasures; it might even be
able to increase ASBM production. However, the United States might counter
the ASBM threat by developing hardware and operational concepts that increase
Continued on page 94
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ESTIMATING THE AREA OF UNCERTAINTY
As noted earlier, Hagt and Durnin say that China’s satellite systems might be
able to collect data sufficient to detect, locate, and identify an aircraft carrier
(CV) within ASBM range by 2015. (They note, however, China will have too
few satellites to track the CV continuously.) They point out that data from reporting satellites would have to be transmitted to a ground station for processing. They note that the U.S. data link system has greater bandwidth than
China’s; even so, they say, it would take the United States five minutes to
transmit such data. Given these observations, I assume this transmission
would take more than five minutes but use that figure as a lower bound. Once
transmission was complete, the ground station would need time to process
the data and estimate the CV’s location. In addition, ASBM-carrying TELs
would need ten to fifteen minutes to prepare to fire. If we assume that those
TELs would be told to begin those preparations soon after the ground station
received needed data, we might conclude (optimistically for China) that fifteen minutes would be sufficient for both ground-station data analysis/sensor
fusion and TEL launch preparation. If the TEL fired on completing those steps,
the ASBM would require another twelve to fifteen minutes to fly to the target.
At a minimum, therefore, from thirty-two to thirty-five minutes would elapse
between the time that satellites gathered necessary data and when the ASBM
hit. At thirty-five knots, the carrier could travel roughly thirty-one kilometers
in that time.
Note that the timeline just computed implicitly assumes that China’s political leaders have given orders to its military to fire as soon as it has precise
carrier-location data. This assumption may well prove wrong if the United
States and China were not yet shooting at each other. In that case, China’s political leaders might want to be notified when a CV was identified and located
within range, so that they could decide whether to attack, on the basis of
their up-to-the-minute assessment of the political situation. If so, a delay
while the politicians decide what to do is quite likely. The longer that delay,
the greater the chances that the AOU would grow so large that Chinese satellites would have to locate the CV again.

HOW MANY ASBMS ARE NEEDED TO COVER THE AOU?
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) expects China’s ASBM’s warhead reentry
vehicle to use an on-board high-altitude radar seeker to look for the carrier
and to correct its trajectory accordingly. As the RV gets closer to earth, ONI apparently expects, active radar would take a “second look” and guide the
ASBM’s RV until it can rely on a “passive” seeker to guide it the rest of the way
to the target.*
Given the process just described, Chinese weaponeers need to know the
ASBM RV radar seeker’s “footprint”—the size of the area on the earth’s surface that it can search. Even if the United States had no active defenses, China
would need to plan to shoot enough ASBMs so that, taken together, their
seeker footprints would cover the AOU.
Hagt and Durnin report that Chinese analysts have referred to a “‘kill radius’ (the distance the target could deviate from initial position and still be
struck)” for a carrier targeted by an incoming ASBM. They cite three different
Chinese kill-radius estimates: twenty, forty, and a hundred kilometers. It is unclear whether the Chinese analysts who made the twenty- and forty-kilometer
estimates did so based on seeker capabilities or arrived at these figures some
other way. Of course, “kill radius” as just defined only applies if the ASBM’s
seeker can cover the entire circle. Therefore, table 2 uses these figures as the
radii of “seeker footprints,” to illustrate the minimum number of RVs required to cover the first sidebar’s thirty-one-kilometer minimum-radius AOU
and, for comparison, a sixty-kilometer AOU. (I used hexagonal approximations to make these estimates and rounded upward.)
* This description is based on the ONI illustration in Stokes, China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic
Strike Capability, p. 21.
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TABLE 2
NUMBER OF RVS REQUIRED GIVEN AOUS OF VARIOUS SIZES
RV Seeker “Footprint” Radius Estimates

AOU
Radius
(km)

20 km

40 km

100 km

31

6

1

1

60

13

6

1

Continued from page 92

the size of the AOUs that China sees and that drive up the chances that Chinese
seekers will direct RVs to the wrong targets or fail in other ways.
CHINESE BALLISTIC MISSILES VS. U.S. AIR BASES ASHORE: CSS-6
VS. KADENA
Land-based aircraft could make important contributions in the event of conflict
over Taiwan. Big-wing planes like tankers and AWACS would act as “force multipliers” for fighter/attack aircraft operating from both land bases and carriers.
Why Focus on Kadena? A recent RAND analysis asserted that the U.S. Air Force
can conduct air operations most efficiently from bases no more than five hundred miles away from the target.38 Kadena, at 460 miles, is the only U.S. air base
within five hundred miles of the Taiwan Strait. Table 3 provides relevant data
concerning the next-closest U.S. bases.
The “distance to the strait” column understates Kadena’s advantage compared to Osan and Kunsan. Both Korean bases are more vulnerable to Chinese
attack, since they are roughly four hundred kilometers from the closest Chinese
territory; Kadena is more than six hundred kilometers distant. In addition, if
big-wing aircraft were to operate from Korean bases, they would likely not fly
directly to operating areas east of Taiwan. Such a flight path would place these
planes dangerously close to China and make them vulnerable to attack by Chinese fighters. Of course, a more circuitous route would reduce the time they
could spend on station in support of carrier- or land-based fighter/attack aircraft. In addition, such a route would reduce even further the amount of fuel
that tankers could deliver.
How Many CSS-6s Would Put Kadena Out of Action? Suppose that China
sought to crater Kadena’s runways. Given highly accurate missiles, it might do
39
so with as few as twelve unitary warheads. Six warheads could divide each
3,700-meter runway into three segments, none of which would be long enough
to permit fighters—to say nothing of AWACS or tanker aircraft—to land.
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TABLE 3
U.S. AIR BASES ASHORE CLOSEST TO TAIWAN
Air Base

Number of
Runways

Runway
Length(s)

Fixed-Wing Aircraft

Distance to Taiwan
Strait (km/mi)

Kadena

2

3,700 m

F-15, E-3 AWACS, P-3, RC-135V/W Rivet
Joint, RC-135U Combat Sent and WC-135
Constant Phoenix, F-22*

Osan

1

2,743 m

F-16, OA-10

1,360/845

Kunsan

1

2,743 m

F-16

1,263/785

Iwakuni

1

2,440 m

F/A-18, F-35†

1,424/885

740/460

Notes:
* F-22s from Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, routinely deploy as units to Kadena.
† The Marines reportedly plan to operate F-35s from Iwakuni.

Calculations based on RAND Corporation analyses show that forty CSS-6
warheads configured as cluster munitions could completely cover all the areas
40
where big-wing aircraft would stand between landing and takeoff. (Some
fighter-sized aircraft could survive such an attack, because Kadena has fifteen
hardened shelters.) Of course, the effectiveness of a cluster-munition attack depends on how many large aircraft are on the ground at the time. Satellites could
presumably report when many are present, and China could launch CSS-6s soon
after.
China’s best approach would appear to be a combination attack. First, it could
fire missiles to crater runways and prevent aircraft from taking off. Next, it could fire
missiles with cluster munitions to destroy unsheltered aircraft. (Of course, China
would do well to develop and employ still other weapons to help its ballistic-missile
attack succeed. For example, it might employ antiradiation missiles [ARMs] to attack Patriot radars.)
If the United States were willing to bear the costs associated with preparing
for a war that most observers judge unlikely, it could make preparations that
would reduce Kadena’s vulnerability to attacks like those just described.
Rapid-repair kits might enable ground personnel to restore runways to operable
condition. Additional shelters would permit F-15s and F-22s to ride out attacks.
Whether the U.S. Air Force would be willing to budget for such passive defenses
is an entirely separate question, of course. (Fliers prefer buying airplanes to buying concrete. They sometimes act like they need to buy planes just in case but
41
will somehow know to buy concrete just in time.) In any case, shelters for
big-wing aircraft seem prohibitively costly.
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What Is the ABM-vs.-CSS-6 Balance at Kadena? Kadena’s Patriot battalion reportedly has four missile batteries armed with the PAC-3 ABM. Patriot batteries
nominally have eight launchers apiece; each PAC-3 launcher has sixteen missiles. Even if the Kadena PAC-3 battalion has no reloads for its launchers, these
figures imply an inventory of 512 (i.e., 4 × 8 × 16) missiles. DoD reports that it
42
will have bought 791 PAC-3 missiles by the end of fiscal 2010; accordingly, a
Kadena inventory of 512 missiles would constitute roughly two-thirds of all U.S.
PAC-3 missiles worldwide.
The Army has fourteen Patriot battalions. Not all are armed with the PAC-3
missile. Even so, it does not seem plausible, especially in light of the Iranian missile threat, that a single battalion on Okinawa would have two-thirds of all
PAC-3 missiles. So let us assume that only 264 PAC-3s (roughly a third of the total) are based there.
Suppose we also assume that Kadena’s Patriots enjoy perfect warning and engage incoming Chinese CSS-6s with two PAC-3s apiece. If so, these ABMs could
engage 132 Chinese missiles. If each PAC-3 enjoyed a 0.7 probability of kill (Pk),
Kadena’s ABMs would destroy all but twelve of these 132 incoming missiles. The
133rd missile and all that followed would be unopposed.
Given these assumptions, China could crater Kadena’s runways and destroy
all unsheltered aircraft by firing 172 CSS-6s. DoD reports that China has 350 to
43
400 CSS-6 missiles and is building from twenty to forty more each year. Thus,
inventory numbers alone suggest that China has a “home game” advantage in
the competition of CSS-6 vs. PAC-3 analogous to the advantage it enjoys in the
contest of ASBM vs. SM-3. (Of course, China would need far fewer CSS-6s if it
44
destroyed Patriot radars with ARMs.)
Of course, much depends on circumstances impossible to predict. If a Taiwan
crisis were to arise after missile attacks on friends of the United States in the
Middle East, for example, Kadena might have fewer PAC-3s than assumed above.
What Role Might THAAD and MEADS Play in Defense of Air Bases Ashore?
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a hit-to-kill Army missile system designed to shoot down short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles in their terminal phases. THAAD has been in development since 1992 but
only recently entered production. According to the Missile Defense Agency, “The
THAAD missile is uniquely designed to intercept targets both inside and outside
the Earth’s atmosphere, making the use of countermeasures in their terminal
45
phase difficult against THAAD.” If that prediction proves accurate, each
THAAD missile deployed to protect Kadena will enhance active defense effectiveness there.
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The MDA will deliver twenty-five THAAD missiles to operational units in fiscal year (FY) 2010. In the near future, MDA expects production of forty-eight
46
THAAD missiles per year. If most or all were devoted to defending Kadena,
they would make active defenses more effective than otherwise. However, since
THAAD will be available in relatively small numbers for several more years,
these missiles might better be devoted to the defense of Andersen Air Force Base,
47
on Guam.
The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is a joint U.S., German,
and Italian project originally intended to replace the Patriot air-defense system.
It was to “provide a robust, 360-degree defense against the full spectrum of ballistic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles,
48
tactical air to surface missiles, as well as rotary and fixed wing threats.” If such a
system were to be developed successfully and were then deployed in sizable
numbers, it too might contribute to Kadena’s defense. However, the Army has
reportedly concluded that MEADS is too costly and unlikely to perform as
49
needed.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CHOICES
The “battle of the inventories” argument just made rests on DoD reports of Chinese missile production to date and projections about future ABM production,
on competing demands for ABMs, on RAND analyses of Kadena vulnerability,
and on the judgment of many analysts that China will prove able to field an effective ASBM system. The upshot is that active defenses likely cannot adequately
counter the threat posed by China’s “antiaccess” ballistic missiles.
If U.S. ABMs cannot defeat enemy countermeasures, of course, active defenses will prove even more inadequate. The variety of countermeasures China
might field and the apparent failure to test ABMs rigorously against them makes
the case for “business as usual” ABM acquisition even weaker. Given the limits of
active defense, the United States needs to assess other ways of protecting carriers
and air bases ashore. It must make such an assessment in light of the large costs
and (as we have seen) limited benefits of buying all the ABMs called for in current plans. Indeed, the United States should decide which other initiatives for
carrier and air-base defense deserve increased funding and effort, even at the
cost of decreased funding and effort for active defense.
Such initiatives fall into two broad categories. On one hand are measures such
as attacks on Chinese missile launchers. On the other hand are passive defense
measures. Detailed discussion of these options is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I provide examples of possible approaches and comment on costs
and benefits. I argue against approaches involving attacks on Chinese soil and
for the reinvigoration of passive defense.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/10
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Aggressive Measures to Supplement Active Defense
Given the “home field” advantage that China enjoys in the ballistic missile–
vs.–ABM competition, the United States could choose to try to “thin the herd”
of missiles that China could effectively fire. Such alternatives deserve analytic
scrutiny.
Attacks on Missile Launchers. This approach to reducing the ASBM and CSS-6
threat has some obvious downsides. One involves technical feasibility. China’s
ASBMs and CSS-6s are fired from mobile transporter-erector launchers. This
means that the United States has to find TELs before it can strike them. That is
hard to do. In both Persian Gulf wars, the United States was not able to find Scud
launchers despite overwhelming air superiority. American aircraft over China
would be outnumbered in the air and face numerous surface-to-air missiles, so
hunting for TELs would be even harder. The United States might well be unable
to diminish substantially China’s ASBM inventory advantage by attacking
launchers.
Another possible downside involves political constraints. To have the best
chance of offsetting China’s inventory advantage, the United States would need
to attack Chinese launchers before they began firing. However, it is hard to
imagine American political leaders granting permission for preemptive attacks
against an adversary with nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles.
When faced with such an adversary during the Cold War, the United States took
great care to avoid fighting the Soviet Union directly. It did not conduct attacks
on Soviet territory and relied on proxies even when combat occurred elsewhere,
like Afghanistan. It is hard to see American political leaders behaving differently
as a means of compensating for inadequacies in ABM capabilities. After all, one
reason for investing in missile defense is to give political leaders options apart
from direct attacks on nuclear-armed adversaries.
Attacks on Chinese Command and Control (C2). Suppose that the United States
could deny China the ability to send launch orders promptly once a carrier was
identified and located or at least could delay such messages. Doing so would increase the size of the area of uncertainty and thus the number of missiles the attacker would have to fire to be successful. Thus, successful disruption of Chinese
C2 might help to offset “Red’s” inventory advantage.
Whether C2 attacks would face the same political constraints as launcher attacks depends on the technology employed. If the United States were able to disrupt command and control without kinetic attacks on Chinese soil (e.g., via
cyberspace attack), American political leaders might go along. Otherwise, attacks
against C2 might encounter the same political resistance as attacks on TELs.
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Attacks on Chinese ISR Assets. As noted earlier, one way to decrease the effectiveness of China’s ASBM inventory is to increase the size of the AOUs that
China’s missileers face. Imaginable ways to do so include attacks on Chinese satellites or on OTH radar ashore. As with other “thin the herd” approaches, the
feasibility of such attacks depends on both technical and political factors. Advocates of such attacks to compensate for active-defense shortcomings face a substantial burden of proof.
Passive Means of Supplementing Active Defenses
Fortunately, the United States might well compensate for the limits of its active
defenses in ways that do not involve the risks just described. Doing so would involve vigorous development and testing of passive defenses and energetic deployment of those that show promise.
The Case for Reinvigorating Passive Defense at Sea. Of course, the fact that active defense is inadequate does not prove that passive defense will work. However, it does mean that if the Navy is serious about possible conflict with China,
it should reallocate resources from active to passive defense. The Navy should
use increased passive-defense spending to support a rigorous program of hardware development, operational testing, and change in peacetime operating procedures. Such initiatives will permit the United States to assess more accurately
the extent to which enhanced passive defense can check the ASBM threat.
Efforts to reinvigorate passive defense at sea would likely include severe radar
and communications emissions control, use of decoys and deception emitters,
development and deployment of obscurants, and adoption of operational pat50
terns that China would find hard to predict. The United States should not only
develop the hardware needed to permit such operations but publicize the fact.
Indeed, the nation should consider pretending to embrace certain passive defenses, even if they have drawbacks that would make commanders reluctant to
use them in wartime.
Reinvigorated passive defense should, of course, increase the area of uncertainty that Chinese systems confront and thus drive up the odds that the ASBM
system would prove unable to perform its missions. Even if convincingly pretended rather than genuine, such efforts might also erode Chinese confidence
and induce costly investments to restore that confidence. Finally, such initiatives
might persuade the Chinese not to launch ASBM attacks in situations where
they might otherwise have done so.
Reinvigorated passive defenses will come at a cost. One retired naval intelligence officer puts the point this way:
It is very demanding to maximize a CVN’s [nuclear-powered aircraft carrier’s] operational effectiveness while minimizing its signature. Given the advanced sensors that

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/10

NWCR_Autumn2010-Hoyler.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Thursday, August 19, 2010 1:27:02 PM

16

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

100

Hoyler: China’s “Antiaccess” Ballistic Missiles and U.S. Active Defense

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

China says that it is fielding, the U.S. Navy will have to take countertargeting very seriously—much more seriously than it currently does or did during the Cold War.
Rigorous countertargeting will have to be standard operating procedure, not a periodic and half-hearted event that is readily suspended for safety of operations. In particular, sufficiently effective countertargeting operations entail increased casualty and
equipment risks in peacetime operations from operating in what is essentially a wartime mode. If the U.S. Navy is going to operate ships within the range arc of these advanced missiles and their targeting sensors, it must fully train for it, invest heavily in
passive defense/countertargeting systems, and be ready to accept increased risk and
51
potentially higher peacetime loss rate (both people and equipment).

Of course, the United States could continue to spend money as planned and to
shortchange passive defense. Unfortunately, the result might well be to make
U.S. carriers far more vulnerable than they would be if we allocated our efforts
differently.
The Case for Enhanced Passive Defense of Air Bases Ashore. Military-spending
advocates often argue that only real capability deters a serious opponent. If that
is true, the United States needs to assess the prospects that increased efforts at
passive defense would enable air bases like Kadena to survive determined and re52
peated Chinese attacks. Of course, passive defense of (inherently fixed) land
bases is in critical respects more difficult than passive defense of (inherently mobile) ships. So it is entirely possible that passive defense investments would pay
off at sea and fail ashore.
That said, what kinds of passive defense investments should the United States
consider, if it is serious about using the U.S. Air Force in a conflict with China?
(Indeed, if it does not take that prospect seriously, why does it need the F-22?)
Several deserve mention.

• RAND reports “weakly protected fuel storage” at Kadena; the United States
should evaluate the costs and payoffs of various fixes.

53

• The United States should consider building additional hardened shelters
for fighters. If it fails to do so, relatively modest ballistic-missile investments would enable China to destroy large numbers of extremely costly
F-22s.

• If U.S. intelligence concludes that Chinese CSS-6s are sufficiently accurate
to sever runways with modest numbers of warheads, the United States
should evaluate the costs and benefits of having enough rapid-runwayrepair kits on hand to restore runways after repeated cratering attacks. Of
course, all kits should be able to pass realistic tests—for example, will the
concrete “set up” in a timely way during the rainy season?
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The vulnerability of big-wing aircraft means the United States should consider unorthodox alternatives. For example, it should evaluate whether to
build hardened shelters for the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, a twin-engine turboprop aircraft, and buy E-2Ds for land-based use. Although they are normally
based on carriers and are in some respects inferior to the land-based E-3
AWACS, folding-wing E-2Ds can do something that an E-3 cannot do if caught
on the ground by a ballistic-missile attack—occupy a shelter and survive a
cluster-munition bombardment.
But does a cost-effective substitute for big-wing tankers exist? This issue deserves analytic scrutiny, in light of the Chinese ballistic-missile threat to U.S. air
bases in Korea and Japan. Attacks on these bases (or denial of permission to use
them) could mean that U.S. tankers would have to operate from Guam, 1,565 kilometers from the Taiwan Strait. Even massive investments in larger tanker fleets
to operate from Guam might not solve the problem. China could respond to
such developments by developing the means (e.g., ballistic missiles, or cruise
missiles from submarines) to attack “big wings” on Guam.
If Chinese ballistic-missile threats to U.S. carriers and air bases evolve along the
lines described above, the United States needs to compensate for the shortcomings of active defense. Certain kinds of attacks might “thin the herd” of threatening missiles; others involve prohibitive risks.
Passive defense efforts appear more promising, especially in helping carriers
survive. Even so, the vulnerability of big-wing aircraft may prove an insoluble
problem. If so, destruction of tanker aircraft would reduce the effectiveness of
both carrier fighter-bombers and land-based ones.
In the worst case, a rigorous program of hardware development, changes in
peacetime operations, and operational testing might lead the United States to
conclude that reinvigorated passive defense cannot adequately offset the inadequacy of active defense. Such an outcome would not mean that the future is
hopeless. It would mean that the United States should consider a broader menu
of alternatives. For example, the nation might respond by stepping up efforts to
develop very-long-range, stealthy, carrier-based unmanned combat aircraft, as
54
suggested by Thomas Ehrhard and Robert Work. Or it might help Taiwan de55
velop a “porcupine defense,” as suggested by William Murray. That approach
might well enable Taiwan to hold out for several months or longer, even if sudden Chinese missile strikes put its air force and navy out of action. The United
States might pursue both these alternatives and develop others equally
promising.
Strategy involves weighing costs and benefits. Given the increased costs and
risks implied by China’s emerging missile forces, the United States needs to
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consider more broadly how best to protect its interests in the western Pacific.
More of the same—active defense—is unlikely to work.

NOTES

The author wishes to thank Professors Tom
Fedyszyn and Bill Murray and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and
criticisms.
1. “With the emergence in China of a robust
area-denial force of great range . . . the time
has again come to talk about sea control.”
Robert C. Rubel, “Talking about Sea Control,” in this issue.
2. See, for example, Andrew S. Erickson and
David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control
the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the
Antiship Ballistic Missile,” and Eric Hagt and
Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic
Missile: Developments and Missing Links,”
both Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009).
3. For a good overview of the systems that constitute China’s “maritime battle network,” see
Thomas Ehrhard and Robert Work, Range,
Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case
for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air
System (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), pp.
197–201.
4. For a refreshingly original argument that
China’s ASBM program mainly threatens
“carrier-like vessels” operated by other western Pacific navies, see Craig Hooper and
Christopher Albon, “Get Off the Fainting
Couch,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(April 2010). Hooper and Albon also are unusual in emphasizing the fact that China has
not yet conducted at-sea tests of the system.
Most other analysts seem sure that China will
soon have an ASBM that works.
5. “Chinese doctrinal writings clearly indicate
that the American presence in Japan would
likely be the subject of attack if the United
States were to intervene in a cross-strait conflict.” Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Missile
Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 3
(Summer 2010), pp. 46–47. Dr. Yoshihara’s

article “focuses narrowly on Chinese assessments of U.S. naval bases in Japan, excluding
the literature on such other key locations as . . .
Kadena” (p. 40). Even so, the use of ballistic
missiles that I discuss fits well the mind-set
he describes.
6. As detailed later in this article, China would
need to reduce the CSS-6 payload somewhat
to extend its range sufficiently to reach
Kadena. See note 12.
7. Context makes clear that Admiral Walsh was
using “missile defense” as this phrase is typically used—to refer to active missile defenses
like Aegis BMD. The full text of the relevant
passage from the Japanese newspaper Asahi
Shimbun reads: “When asked how much of
an actual threat China’s anti-ship ballistic
missiles (ASBMs) pose to the U.S. Navy, he
did not answer directly, saying only, ‘I think
it represents a continued advancement and
maturing of technology.’ He added: ‘If you
remember, there were many, several years
ago, who were critical of the missile defense
program. Now we find the missile defense
program as being something that’s essential
to our ability to operate freely.’” See Yoichi
Kato, “U.S. Commander Blasts Chinese
Navy’s Behavior,” Asahi Shimbun, 16 June
2010.
8. Surprisingly, the open-source literature does
not contain much evidence that either Chinese or American analysts have compared
projected ASBM and ABM inventories and
noticed China’s numerical advantages.
9. For a discussion of costs in an ASBM-vs.SM-3 competition, see Thomas Culora, “The
Strategic Implications of Obscurants,” Naval
War College Review 63, no. 3 (Summer 2010),
pp. 74–75.
10. The P-8 Poseidon, slated to replace the P-3, is
also too large to shelter. AWACS is based on
the E-3 Sentry aircraft, which is a modified
Boeing 707; the P-3, a four-engine turboprop
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aircraft, is a modified Lockheed Electra
airliner.
11. Kadena and aircraft based there might prove
unavailable for reasons apart from a successful CSS-6 attack. For example, cruise missiles
pose another potential threat to unsheltered
aircraft. (For more detail on that threat, see
John Stillion and David Orletsky, Airbase
Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile
and Ballistic-Missile Attacks [Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, 1999], pp. 15–17.) Of course,
the all-too-plausible prospect that Kadena
and other Japanese bases will not survive to
make a difference in U.S.-Chinese combat
over Taiwan raises a political uncertainty. In
combination with other factors, this prospect
may lead Japan to deny the United States permission to use its bases.
12. The CSS-6 delivers a 500 kg payload at a
range of 600 km. The distance from Kadena
to the closest point in mainland China is
about 640 km. So Chinese missileers will have
to reduce the payload somewhat to extend
the CSS-6’s range. For an analysis of trading
off payload to increase ballistic-missile range,
see R. L. Pope, R. D. Irvine, and S. J.
Retallick, Range/Payload Trade-Offs for Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, DSTO-RR-0025 (Canberra: Australian Department of Defence,
n.d.). Extrapolating from that article, I estimate that cutting the CSS-6 payload by about
12 percent will increase its range to 666 km.
13. These analyses include the already-cited papers by Ehrhard and Work, Erickson and
Yang, and Hagt and Durnin. See also Mark
Stokes, China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability (Arlington, Va.: Project
2049 Institute, 14 September 2009).
14. SIGINT involves interception of communications, radar, and other forms of electromagnetic transmissions. Subcategories of SIGINT
include ELINT and COMINT (communications intelligence).
15. When operating under EMCON military
units, such as carriers, restrict their electronic
emissions to a certain level in order to “hide”
from others’ SIGINT assets.
16. Hagt and Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic
Missile,” p. 94.
17. Ibid., p. 95.
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19. Hagt and Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic
Missile,” p. 105.
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